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Abstract 3 
The Paris Agreement will greatly benefit from the past experience with international market 4 
mechanisms for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reductions and related regulatory systems, which 5 
have gone through four periods with specific challenges. The first period 1997 - 2004 operationalized 6 
the mechanisms defined in the Kyoto Protocol, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint 7 
Implementation (JI). Pilot activities in different sectors were undertaken by the public sector, and 8 
the first baseline and monitoring methodologies officially approved. Between 2005 and 2011, the 9 
carbon markets expanded massively. The EU emission trading scheme (EU ETS) was linked to the 10 
Kyoto mechanisms, creating demand for carbon credits from the private sector. During this “gold 11 
rush” period criticism emerged with regarding the uneven geographical distribution of projects, as 12 
well as environmental integrity problems related to baselines and additionality. The next period saw 13 
a collapse in carbon prices between 2012 and 2014, limiting the development of new projects. The 14 
quantitative limits on the offset use in the EU ETS were reached and the failure to agree on a new 15 
international regime resulted in a drying up of demand from governments. The 2015 – 2018 period 16 
is characterized by a gradual stabilization of the international climate regime. The Paris Agreement 17 
adopted in 2015 increases complexity through global participation in mitigation. Future carbon 18 
markets will therefore face both old challenges – supply-demand balance, environmental integrity, 19 
transaction costs – and new ones – interactions with other policies and national targets, and 20 
sectoral/policy baselines and additionality checks preventing hot air proliferation. 21 
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 2 
The roller coaster ride of international carbon market mechanisms over the last 20 years has four 3 
phases, ranging from exuberance (2005 – 2011) to hibernation (2012-2014), determined by 4 
changes in public and private demand for carbon credits and the varying ability of regulators to 5 
credibly operationalize the mechanisms. 6 
Introduction 7 
The rules for market mechanisms for climate change mitigation under the Paris Agreement are 8 
currently being negotiated and are expected to be adopted at COP25 in December 2019. These new 9 
mechanisms will greatly benefit from the past experience with international carbon markets under 10 
the Kyoto Protocol. In order to draw lessons from the past experience, we review changes in 11 
international market mechanisms for climate change mitigation and related regulatory systems from 12 
1997 to 2016. Peer-reviewed literature is the backbone of our review while non-peer-reviewed 13 
sources have been used if they are published by an institution that has credible internal quality 14 
control processes. The following search terms were applied to the HEC Paris Library database of peer 15 
reviewed journal articles published between 1997 and 2018: ("carbon price" OR CDM OR "market 16 
mechanism" OR "carbon finance" OR "carbon credit" OR "Carbon Fund" OR "Clean Development 17 
Mechanism" OR "Joint Implementation" OR "regulatory regime" OR "Article 6" OR "Kyoto 18 
Mechanism" OR "baseline methodology" OR "additionality" OR "compliance market" OR "voluntary 19 
market" OR "Paris Agreement") AND ("carbon"). The initial search yielded 5353 results. After 20 
removing duplicates, we screened the titles of publications and removed those that were deemed 21 
irrelevant to the topic of the review. Out of the remaining 1148 papers we then excluded theoretical 22 
papers on emissions trading further narrowing the number of peer-reviewed papers to 792. 19 23 
seminal papers and review articles were identified by recognized experts in the field after the 24 
general literature search. This was particularly important for literature on market mechanisms under 25 
the Paris Agreement due to the relatively recent emergence of the topic and lack of relevant 26 
academic literature that has passed the lengthy peer review process. The total number of articles 27 
reviewed thus increased to 811. 28 
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As a next step, we scanned through the abstracts of the retained papers and extracted key 1 
messages. Using expert review of the abstracts, a total of about 300 peer reviewed articles were 2 
retained in addition to about 40 papers from “grey literature”. The remainder of the article presents 3 
the findings using a synthetic narrative along the four stages in the evolution of carbon markets: 4 
emergence, “gold rush”, fragmentation and post-Paris perspectives. Specifically, for each of the four 5 
stages we draw lessons regarding the main features of the period and key market and regulatory 6 
challenges. Finally, we provide recommendations for future international carbon market 7 
mechanisms. 8 
THE EMERGENCE OF CARBON MARKETS: 1997-2004 9 
Main features of the period: conception and emergence of carbon markets 10 
At the origins: the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol 11 
The practical concept of carbon markets emerged in the 1990s. The starting point was Article 4.2 of 12 
the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) with its rule on “Joint Implementation” 13 
(JI) for greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation by several countries. This was seen as a window to develop 14 
market mechanisms by several European and North American countries. An early assessment of the 15 
US Initiative on JI, for instance, elaborated on the experience with 31 pilot projects in South-East 16 
Asia (e.g. carbon sequestration in Indonesia through reduced impact logging, and rural electrification 17 
in Sri Lanka) and derived recommendations for market mechanisms (Dixon, 1998). Given opposing 18 
views between developing and industrialized countries on whether such mechanisms made sense 19 
COP 1 in 1995 decided to start a pilot phase of the “Activities Implemented Jointly” (AIJ) lasting until 20 
2000 without generation of emission credits. This allowed countries to test different market 21 
mechanism design options (see Dutschke and Michaelowa, 2003, for Costa Rica, which was a 22 
pioneering host country, and Springer, 2003, for the Swedish approach to invest in the Baltic states). 23 
Costa Rica was the first developing country to implement AIJ in several sectors including 24 
conservation, reforestation and renewable energy (wind and hydro). An assessment of 11 AIJ 25 
projects from the Swedish pilot program (energy efficiency and renewable energy in the Baltic 26 
countries) showed that project implementation costs were higher than projected, while GHG 27 
emission reductions were lower than ex-ante estimations. It was also suggested that such project 28 
risks can be mitigated by carbon funds through aggregation of demand (Springer, 2003).  29 
While the economic rationale for industrialized countries to invest in activities in developing 30 
countries due to lower mitigation costs was not challenged, Zhang (1997) and Swisher (1997) 31 
identified various benefits and risks for developing countries. Presaging debates that fully erupted in 32 
the 2010s, some authors (Michaelowa and Schmidt, 1997) supported carbon crediting1 for JI to 33 
                                                          
1 A carbon credit is a generic tradable certificate or permit for GHG emissions reduced or removed from the 
atmosphere (e.g. tons of CO2e) from generating mitigation activity. It is hence an instrument that represents 
ownership of a standardized unit of GHG emission reductions that can be traded, sold, retired or transferred. 
Crediting here refers to the issuance of a carbon credit (a tCO2) for an equivalent reduction of GHG emissions. 
Offsetting refers to the use of carbon credits within different schemes, e.g., Certified Emission Reductions 
(CERs) could be used as offsets under ETS or domestic carbon pricing but can also be cancelled and hence 
contribute to net mitigation. 
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ensure efficient mitigation in the short term and mobilize technology transfer but proposed to 1 
progressively reduce the crediting in the long term to ensure innovation and research and 2 
development on low-carbon technologies/measures through increasing domestic carbon prices. 3 
The Kyoto Protocol (KP), adopted in 1997, set GHG emissions reduction targets for 38 industrialized 4 
countries and economies in transition (EIT) – Annex B Parties to the Protocol. These mitigation 5 
targets were defined through emissions allowances – assigned amount units (AAUs) – allocated to 6 
countries. In order to maximize the economic efficiency of achieving their emission reduction or 7 
limitation targets, Annex B Parties were allowed to use three market mechanisms. They could 8 
exchange AAUs through international emissions trading (IET) and use carbon credits resulting from 9 
emissions reduction projects – Joint Implementation (JI) in Annex B countries (generating Emissions 10 
Reduction Units, ERUs) and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) in non-Annex B countries 11 
(generating Certified Emissions Reductions, CERs) (Shishlov et al., 2016)2. The CDM arose from the 12 
Brazilian Proposal's Clean Development Fund, and the concept was developed jointly by Brazil and 13 
the United States in the weeks preceding the Kyoto Conference of Parties in 1997 (Cole, 2012). The 14 
CDM project cycle typically involves the development of the Project Design Document (PDD), 15 
approval of the project by the host country through a Letter of Approval (LoA), validation by an 16 
independent auditor, project registration, monitoring of emissions reductions, independent 17 
verification, CER issuance and forwarding. All project documentation as well as monitoring reports 18 
are publicly available on the UNFCCC website giving the mechanism an unprecedented level of 19 
transparency, which in terms allowed for scrutiny by researchers and helped improve the 20 
mechanism (Shishlov and Bellassen, 2012). 21 
Expected benefits from international carbon markets 22 
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, many researchers foresaw significant benefits of the Kyoto 23 
Mechanisms. Jepma and van Der Gaast (2003) and Chen (2003) stressed their potential to achieve 24 
considerable mitigation cost savings and foster a multi-billion-dollar market for carbon credits. The 25 
size of the carbon market would be driven by Annex B demand, on the one hand, and institutional 26 
barriers in host countries, on the other (Michaelowa and Jotzo, 2005). Dutschke and Michaelowa 27 
(2003) emphasized the need for sufficient economic incentives for investors from developed 28 
countries investing in CDM projects in developing countries. For example, an early assessment of the 29 
power sector in Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Vietnam by Shrestha (2004) concluded that CER prices of 30 
USD 4-5/tCO2e would support fuel switch from coal to gas and oil, but were insufficient to mobilize 31 
renewable energy (RE) projects. In order to maximize benefits, non-Annex I countries should 32 
participate actively in the rule design process for the flexible mechanisms (Painuly, 2001). Fehse 33 
(2003) highlighted capacity building and technology transfer benefits of the mechanisms, as well as 34 
co-benefits for biodiversity protection. In terms of the geographical potential, China emerged as 35 
potential frontrunner due to the high carbon intensity of the power sector and large potential for 36 
improving energy efficiency (EE) (Vrolijk and Liu, 2005).  37 
                                                          
2 The connotation of the term JI thus changed from the earlier terminology used in the UNFCCC. While initially the term JI 
indicated all activities tested during the initial introduction and test period of the market mechanisms, it later indicated only the 
activities that can be implemented in Annex B countries. 
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Key market and regulatory challenges  1 
Concerns were raised regarding low demand and low credit prices (Jotzo and Michaelowa, 2002). 2 
The need to generate sustainable development (SD) benefits, and to support capacity building and 3 
data collection was identified by Begg et al. (2001) while Fichtner et al. (2002) and Kim (2004) noted 4 
that projects would need to strike a balance between aspiration to deliver SD benefits and their 5 
economic rationale. Chomitz (2002) and Geres and Michaelowa (2002) stressed the risk of carbon 6 
leakage and the need for monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV). The risk that “hot air”3, i.e. 7 
surpluses of the domestic emissions budget could be “laundered” through JI was raised early on 8 
(Bollen et al., 1999; Jotzo and Michaelowa, 2002). Artificial arguments that baseline investments 9 
would be highly carbon-intensive in order to maximize credits were seen as risk by Schreuder and 10 
Sherry (2001). A solution for that problem would be clear rules for baseline determination to ensure 11 
environmental integrity (Dutschke and Michaelowa, 2003). Springer (2003) suggested to reduce 12 
technical, political and economic project risks through diversification and saw carbon funds as 13 
effective means in reducing private company risks. 14 
Developing the project documentation, especially regarding additionality determination and 15 
baseline setting as well as third-party validation and verification were seen to generate transaction 16 
costs that could limit the scope of the CDM (Jotzo and Michaelowa, 2002). Small-scale projects were 17 
found to have disproportionally higher transaction costs, and special rules for such projects were 18 
therefore suggested as a potential solution (Spalding-Fecher et al., 2002; Michaelowa et al., 2003). 19 
Simplified rules and procedures were subsequently introduced from 2005 onwards (UNFCCC, 2006). 20 
Additionality and baselines 21 
Two of the key regulatory elements of the Kyoto Mechanisms discussed in the literature are baseline 22 
and additionality determination (Gustavsson et al., 2000; de Coninck and van der Linden, 2003). In 23 
the context of project-based mechanisms, the baseline is the reference scenario that is identified as 24 
the most likely in absence of the proposed project, and against which emission reduction can be 25 
claimed. Additionality indicates that the project would not have occurred anyway in absence of the 26 
revenue from sale of the carbon credits. This concept became one of the most contested issues for 27 
CDM activities starting from this initial period. 28 
Case studies from the power sector in non-Annex 1 countries in 2001 highlighted the high risk for 29 
crediting activities that would be implemented anyway, also in the absence of the CDM, i.e. non-30 
additional projects, which called for the definition of strong rules on additionality to ensure 31 
environmental integrity (Bernow et al., 2001). An assessment of 37 early CDM and 12 JI projects 32 
raised concerns on consistency and additionality (de Coninck and van der Linden, 2003). 33 
Another issue that emerged relates to the perverse incentives leading to overestimation of baselines 34 
to maximize emission reductions potential, leading to difficulties in identifying credible baselines 35 
(Anagnostopoulos et al., 2003). Illum and Meyer (2004) stressed that project-based activities could 36 
only be seen as additional if the baseline was referring to the national energy system where the 37 
                                                          
3 “Hot air” indicates the large surplus of AAUs in some of the emerging economies following the reduction of GHG emissions due 
to the collapse of the socialist economies. 
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project is implemented, capturing the real impacts of other projects implemented in the same 1 
energy system. Thus, a broader sectoral baseline was proposed. Inappropriate baseline settings 2 
ultimately lead to either missing “good” emission reductions opportunities that meet additionality 3 
requirements or to compromising the environmental integrity (Zhang et al., 2005). 4 
THE “GOLD RUSH” PERIOD OF 2005-2011 5 
The period 2005-2011 saw a strong growth of the international carbon markets, triggered by the 6 
2004 decision of the EU on the “linking directive” allowing the use of credits from CDM and JI for 7 
compliance under the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). Under these circumstances, the 8 
mechanisms gained sudden popularity in the private sector and carbon markets grew much more 9 
than originally expected. However, the “gold rush” also exposed problems that were discussed 10 
intensely in the research literature. 11 
Main features of the period: growth and expansion of carbon markets 12 
Supply and demand for carbon credits 13 
The CDM was initially seen as a mechanism for countries that could support governments 14 
significantly reduce the cost of compliance with the KP (Bréchet and Lussis, 2006). But in practice 15 
both supply and demand for CERs was largely privatized and the CDM capacity to attract large 16 
private capital on an annual basis was an unprecedented and non-anticipated feature of the 17 
mechanism (Shishlov and Bellassen, 2012). On the demand side, this privatization was largely 18 
achieved thanks to the EU ETS which provided a large and reliable source of demand for CERs (ibid.).  19 
While the initial use of offsets in the EU 2008-2009 was rather limited (Trotignon, 2012), market 20 
actors realized the cost-saving potential through the use of credits thanks to the EUA/CER price 21 
spread (Vasa, 2012) and the demand from the EU ETS grew in leaps and bounds leading to a “gold 22 
rush” period of the CDM. Figure 1 shows the trend in the pipeline of CDM projects submitted for 23 
validation, registered and those that issued CERs. 24 
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Figure 1. Accumulated number of CDM projects 1 
 2 
Source: UNEP DTU (2019a) 3 
The reduction of GHG mitigation compliance costs for firms in the EU and Japan was estimated at 4 
least around USD 2.3 billion for the period 2008 - 2012 based on the difference between CER and 5 
EUA prices (Spalding-Fecher, 2012). Additionally, for the same period (2008-2012) it was estimated 6 
that for the public sector, the use of CERs by Annex I governments to meet their Kyoto commitments 7 
yielded an additional USD 1.3 billion in savings (ibid.).  8 
In 2005 it became also clear that the so called “unilateral CDM”4 approach could be used, where 9 
stakeholders from developing countries are investing in a mitigation project in anticipation of 10 
potential carbon credit buyers and sell emission credits as a commodity. Unilateral CDM had the 11 
potential to attract investment in a more efficient manner compared to “bilateral” activities in 12 
specific circumstances, for instance through a reduction of transaction costs and low need of 13 
technology transfer (Michaelowa, 2007; Bayer et al., 2013a). Potential for unilateral CDM varied 14 
from country to country, depending on the domestic context and with African countries still 15 
depending on international support to a much higher degree than other developing countries in 16 
Latin America and Asia (Michaelowa, 2007). 17 
While the regulatory uncertainty about the CDM did not allow CER and EUA prices to fully converge 18 
(Mizrach, 2012), a clear correlation was observed (Sadefo Kamdem et al., 2016). It was 19 
demonstrated how price volatility was exacerbated by the decisions of the European Parliament and 20 
suggested the need for policymakers to improve communication of long-term strategies for the EU 21 
ETS (Deeney et al., 2016). Moreover, concerns about price volatility in the primary market due to 22 
imperfect information were also raised (Zavodov, 2012). 23 
                                                          
4 Unilateral CDM are those project activities that are implemented by developing countries and the CERs 
generated by these activities are sold without any participation from Annex I countries. 
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Learning by doing through expansion of the market 1 
Being the first-of-a-kind climate change mitigation instrument, the CDM followed a “learning by 2 
doing” pattern, whereby the transparency of the mechanism allowed for scrutiny by researchers and 3 
NGOs leading to numerous reforms (Shishlov and Bellassen, 2012). The CDM, as well as voluntary 4 
offset schemes, helped developing countries in building technical capacity regarding structuring of 5 
emissions reduction projects and carbon accounting (Mehling and Mielke, 2012). Indeed, a common 6 
view among stakeholder inputs to the CDM Policy Dialogue was that capacity-building for the low-7 
carbon transition in developing countries was one of the most important impacts of the CDM 8 
(Spalding-Fecher, 2012). Especially in large emerging economies like India, China and Brazil very 9 
rapidly an “ecosystem” of CDM consultants emerged (Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2011).  10 
In this phase, private financial institutions were actively participating in the carbon markets as 11 
intermediaries, enhancing liquidity of the market (Weber and Darbellay, 2011), especially in large 12 
countries like China (Fan et al., 2011). While they did not contribute actively to rule setting for CDM 13 
regulatory mechanisms (Haigh, 2011) carbon funds can play a fundamental role in pooling demand 14 
for credits. Moreover, carbon funds are one of the main drivers that enable development banks to 15 
support CDM dissemination especially in low income countries in Africa (Karani and Gantsho, 2007). 16 
International carbon markets and domestic climate policies 17 
The CDM and international carbon finance were also assessed against domestic mitigation policies. 18 
Strand (2011) identified a perverse incentive of the CDM to weaken domestic energy and 19 
environmental policies to leave sufficient potential for emission credits sales through the CDM. Such 20 
considerations led to the definition of the so-called E+ and E- policies to be considered when 21 
identifying the baseline. According to the UNFCCC (2005), E+ policies are “national and/or sectoral 22 
policies or regulations that give comparative advantages to more emissions-intensive technologies 23 
or fuels over less emissions-intensive technologies or fuels”, while the E- policies are “national 24 
and/or sectoral policies or regulations that give comparative advantages to less emissions-intensive 25 
technologies over more emissions-intensive technologies (e.g. public subsidies to promote the 26 
diffusion of renewable energy or to finance energy efficiency programs)”. The E- rule stated that 27 
mitigation policy instruments introduced after the Marrakech Accords do not need to be considered 28 
in assessing additionality of CDM projects. 29 
Key market and regulatory challenges 30 
Economic efficiency, environmental integrity and contribution to sustainable development are 31 
among the key challenges faced by the international carbon market in this period (Shishlov and 32 
Bellassen, 2012; Lewis, 2009). As one extreme, Wara (2007) saw the CDM as an ineffective 33 
instrument with limited results in reducing global GHG emissions. One of the challenges raised with 34 
regards to the CDM was the problem of “low-hanging fruits” being captured by the market, 35 
potentially precluding countries from taking on more ambitious targets (Akita et al., 2012; Peter and 36 
Bumpus, 2012). Quantitative assessment, however, demonstrated that a project-based mechanism 37 
like the CDM could only capture a small share of cheap abatement opportunities, with a notable 38 
exception of China, where it captured almost a third of theoretical low-cost abatement potential 39 
(Castro, 2012). Difficulties in the equalization of marginal abatement costs across sectors were 40 
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identified by Millard-Ball and Ortolano (2010). Cormier and Bellassen (2013) assessed CER issuance 1 
risks and found 29% of CERs lost due to failure of projects (negative validation, project withdrawn, 2 
etc.), 12% due to delays during the approval process (validation and registration), 27% due to delays 3 
at issuance, and only 1% due to underperformance of projects in terms of CER delivered per day. 4 
Only 30% of expected CERs had actually been issued by mid-2011. 5 
This unbalance in favour of GHG emissions reduction over contribution to SD in the CDM postulated 6 
in the first period was now assessed empirically and supported by a text analysis of 744 PDDs 7 
submitted until May 2006 (Olsen and Fenhann, 2008), an assessment of 40 projects from India 8 
(Alexeew et al., 2010), and small samples of 16 (Sutter and Parreño, 2007) and ten projects (Boyd et 9 
al., 2009), respectively. Olsen (2007) provided a thorough literature review up to 2007. Particularly 10 
hydro projects were criticized (Finley-Brook and Thomas 2012). Haya and Parekh (2011) identified 6 11 
CDM hydro projects that resulted in considerable adverse impacts. Lack of proper stakeholder 12 
consultation and potential conflicts of interest in the project approval process are considered as 13 
possible reasons for the cases of human rights violations (Shishlov and Bellassen, 2012).  14 
At the same time, “add-on” standards, such as, for example, the Climate, Community and 15 
Biodiversity (CCB) or Gold Standard used by certain projects have delivered over-proportional co-16 
benefits for poor populations (Crowe, 2013) and local SD in general (Nussbaumer, 2013). 17 
Parnphumeesup and Kerr (2015) found that 56.4% of the buyers were willing to pay a price premium 18 
(on average EUR 1.12/tCO2e) for carbon credits certified under the Gold Standard. Lenzen et al. 19 
(2007) and Olsen and Fenhann (2008) proposed the development of sophisticated tools to prioritize 20 
activities from a SD contribution standpoint that could also be used as a verification protocol for 21 
MRV on the SD impacts. The CDM subsequently adopted a SD tool for voluntary use by project 22 
participants, although it aims at highlighting positive SD impacts rather than being an MRV tool. 23 
China was seen as giving preference to CDM projects in poorer and less developed provinces and 24 
provinces that lack foreign direct investments (FDI) in order to maximize economic co-benefits 25 
(Bayer et al., 2013b; Hong et al., 2013). Energy-related CDM activities in China were seen to deliver 26 
substantial health benefits effects and monetary savings (Vennemo et al., 2006). However, an 27 
assessment of selected hydropower projects in Yunnan province argued while the CDM might have 28 
contributed to boosting hydropower development, their benefits were often not channelled to local 29 
communities (Rousseau, 2017). 30 
Going beyond projects 31 
The project focus of CDM was increasingly seen as outdated. One significant evolution of the CDM 32 
beyond single projects is the introduction of the concept of Program of Activities (PoA) in 2005. This 33 
option allows the registration of multiple activities of the same type without any limit of the number 34 
over a period of 28 years. PoAs reduce transaction costs (Matschoss, 2007), which was confirmed by 35 
empirical studies, such as in the case of a PoA for compact fluorescent lamps (CFL) dissemination in 36 
Chile (Karakosta and Askounis, 2010). Suykens (2010) and Duan (2011) proposed sectoral crediting 37 
mechanisms and explained their design using the case of utilization of associated gas. 38 
Addressing the uneven geographical distribution 39 
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The familiarity factors (colonial history; bilateral trade; and bilateral aid) strongly influence CDM 1 
location decisions (Dolšak and Crandall, 2013). Evidence of CDM projects following closely traditional 2 
FDI patterns was found by von Unger and Streck (2009). Availability of human capital, mitigation 3 
potential, which is indicated by the carbon intensity, existence of profitable markets for CDM co-4 
products (e.g. electricity) increases the chances of hosting CDM activities (Winkelman and Moore, 5 
2011). A comparative analysis of the CDM experience in China and South Africa demonstrated that a 6 
strong industrial and energy policy in the host country plays a crucial role in the development of 7 
CDM (Fay et al., 2012). Policies fostering a low-carbon development pathway encourage the CDM 8 
uptake, rather than CDM driving a low-emission development pathway. In addition, the active 9 
engagement by key government and private sector stakeholders and the presence of a friendly 10 
business environment are crucial. Lack of capacity of local actors, aggravated by limited access to 11 
financing, was identified as a key barrier for entrepreneurship in in the CDM in South Africa (Dolles 12 
et al., 2013). 13 
In the case of Africa and Least-Developed Countries (LDCs), donor agencies provided USD 45 million 14 
for CDM related capacity building until 2009, equivalent to 8% of the total carbon revenues from 15 
these countries. Training activities, for instance support in establishment of the Designated National 16 
Authorities (DNAs), were more successful than activities targeting project mobilization. Efficiency of 17 
assistance was higher when the full CDM process and cycle was supported rather than parts of it 18 
(Okubo and Michaelowa, 2010). 19 
Van der Gaast and Begg (2009) find that PoAs can support a more balanced distribution of CDM 20 
activities. However, the successful use of PoAs is contingent on establishing an appropriate 21 
institutional framework, building local capacity, increasing institutional learning around project 22 
development, and harmonizing evolving carbon finance mechanism (Schomer and van Asselt, 2012, 23 
Hwang and Kim, 2011). Combining market mechanisms with micro-finance can help scale household 24 
programs, such as for example in the case of the diffusion of solar lanterns through micro-loans 25 
(Hogarth, 2012) and thus open new opportunities also for underrepresented countries and 26 
populations. 27 
Additionality 28 
The additionality of CDM projects continued to be severely criticized during the CDM “gold rush” 29 
(Streck and Thiago, 2007; Streck, 2011; Koo, 2017). When regulators replaced the barrier test by an 30 
investment test, this immediately resulted in the share of non-additional projects falling 31 
substantially (Michaelowa and Butzengeiger, 2017). An assessment of projects in India and Brazil 32 
finds that due to the uncertainty of CDM revenues, project developers preferred projects viable 33 
without CDM credits (Hultman et al., 2012). Doubts were raised on the additionality of small hydro 34 
projects in China (Wu and Chen, 2011) and for wind projects (He and Morse, 2013) (in general for 35 
China: Lewis, 2010). An assessment of bagasse power CDM projects in Brazil, India and Thailand 36 
(Amatayakul and Berndes, 2012) found that power purchase agreements rather than carbon credit 37 
sales were decisive for project implementation. Both articles ignore the E- rule due to which 38 
revenues from feed-in tariffs are not accounted for under the CDM. Fearnside (2013) argues large 39 
hydro projects in Amazonia would have likely been implemented without the CDM. For small hydro, 40 
Martins et al. (2013) found that, among the 431 projects which became active in Brazil since 2001, 41 
11 
 
339 were not CDM projects and thus the role of CDM revenue as an incentive was uncertain.  1 
Looking at renewable energy projects, Gilau et al. (2007) suggested that CDM should move away 2 
from a purely “market-oriented“ perspective towards barrier removal. 3 
It is acknowledged that in practice, it is virtually impossible to ensure additionality in 100% of the 4 
cases (Shishlov and Bellassen, 2012). The natural contradiction between strict additionality and not 5 
impeding new environmental policies at the national level partly explains this. The higher 6 
transaction costs which come together with a stringent case-by-case scrutiny are another 7 
explanation. More stringent baselines and performance benchmarks can help ensure net emissions 8 
reductions that could compensate for non-additional projects that manage to slip through. 9 
Ultimately, the additionality test thus becomes a matter of finding the right balance between: “false 10 
positives and false negatives” (Carmichael et al., 2016). Relaxing the additionality demonstration on 11 
a project basis, but at the same time strengthening additionality on a technology level is one 12 
potential option to address the additionality issue (Chung 2007; Castro and Michaelowa, 2010). The 13 
CDM would have to move away from a pure offset mechanism through discounting the volume of 14 
CERs generated (i.e. allowing crediting for only a certain share of total CERs generated, thus 15 
rendering not tradable the remaining share) in order to deliver net mitigation benefits for the world 16 
as a whole and ensure additionality at an aggregated level (Schneider, 2009).  17 
Baselines 18 
Like additionality, baseline determination continued to be controversial during this phase. Strand 19 
and Rosendahl (2012) argued that the asymmetry of information between the regulator (the CDM 20 
Executive Board) and the companies participating in the CDM may result in higher emissions 21 
baselines due to the potential to manipulate data and hence increase overall emissions. A similar 22 
result was identified also for the voluntary carbon market looking at energy efficiency for buildings 23 
in the US (Liu and Cui, 2017). Conservative baselines depending on uncertainty of baseline setting 24 
and credit price levels have been proposed as a possible solution (Bento et al., 2016). Other options 25 
such as standardization of baselines has been suggested to address these issues (Murtishaw et al., 26 
2006; Zhang et al., 2006). Standardized baselines were calculated for the South African Power Pool 27 
(Spalding-Fecher, 2011). This was taken up by the regulators in the post-2010 period. 28 
Technology transfer 29 
Unlike the contribution to sustainable development, technology transfer is not an explicit objective 30 
of the CDM, but it represents an important co-benefit for host countries and has been widely 31 
researched (Schmid, 2012; Cox, 2010; Youngman et al., 2007). In contrast to other co-benefits, the 32 
existing evidence which started emerging during this phase is particularly inconsistent. While in 33 
some views (Schneider et al., 2008) CDM is seen as effective in supporting technology transfer, 34 
lowering existing barriers and enhancing the quality of the transfer, other assessments (Youngman 35 
et al., 2007) concluded that around 50% of CDM projects and 62% of JI involved hardware from 36 
outside the host country by 2007. However, other researchers (Doranova et al., 2010) came to an 37 
opposite conclusion with a majority of CDM activities using domestically produced technologies.  38 
Heterogeneous technology transfer results have been identified across CDM project types with 39 
different degrees of reliance on imported technology (Karakosta et al., 2012). Others (Das, 2011) 40 
reported that technology transfer impacts depend largely on the project type/technology. 41 
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An empirical assessment of the barriers that may slow down technology transfer through carbon 1 
markets identified high tariffs on environmental goods and services as well as burdensome 2 
administrative procedures to launch new businesses as key factors. Other findings indicated that 3 
technology transfer is driven by minimization of the abatement cost rather than actual alignment 4 
with host country priorities and needs (van der Gaast et al., 2009). 5 
A case study of wind power CDM projects in China and India (Lema and Lema, 2013) demonstrates 6 
that while technology transfer does occur, it is based on mechanisms available prior to and 7 
independent of CDM projects. This means that CDM projects tend to use technology transfer 8 
mechanisms and options already available in the country and independent of the CDM component 9 
not the other way around. In China the proportion of total income generated by CERs is high and the 10 
domestic availability of the technology is low, which drives the choice of project owners to use 11 
foreign technologies (Wang, 2010). On the other hand, only limited incentives are identified for 12 
technology transfer in the Chinese renewables sector (Wang and Chen, 2010). 13 
Governance 14 
During the gold rush period, governance issues became highly relevant, especially under the CDM 15 
with a strong participation of private companies. Governance is relevant both on the international 16 
and national levels. Regarding the former, CDM project developers highlight the issue of lack of 17 
transparency on the Executive Board (EB) decision on projects, lack of a mechanism to review or 18 
appeal EB decisions, and limited possibility for interaction along the process. This is a consequence 19 
of the unique nature of the CDM, where the UN directly interacts with the private sector. An 20 
econometric assessment of 250 CDM methodologies and around 1000 registered projects shows 21 
that EB’s final decisions are determined by both formal quality criteria and also on political-22 
economic variables (Flues et al., 2010). Likewise, business and industry NGOs influenced decision-23 
making on CCS under the CDM (Vormedal, 2008). Developed countries and emissions-intensive 24 
companies are effectively influencing the negotiation and the actual implementation of the flexible 25 
mechanisms (Vlachou and Konstantinidis, 2010). In contrast, some authors see a very limited NGO 26 
influence on the CDM and other carbon markets (Lederer, 2012).  27 
The governance structures of the CDM and voluntary markets for carbon offsets are often criticized 28 
as subject to capital-accumulation strategies without public oversight (Bumpus and Liverman, 2008; 29 
Lövbrand et al., 2009). The CDM criticism is reflecting the effectiveness and legitimacy of the 30 
environmental governance at international level (Jacur, 2009). Other authors expressed fears 31 
regarding the fact that in the context of oppressive societies market mechanisms can lead to harmful 32 
effects for the indigenous communities and it is thus necessary to introduce a mechanism for 33 
protecting their rights under the CDM (Finley-Brook and Thomas, 2011). The case of hydropower 34 
development in Yunnan Province in China shows that CDM did not contribute to delivering SD 35 
benefits but it rather consolidated existing power structures (Rousseau, 2017). However, there is 36 
room for improving interactions between the various stakeholders and regulators and increase 37 
participation (Millar and Wilder, 2009; von Unger and Streck, 2009). Governance reforms could allow 38 
the CDM to become a more effective and credible international instrument (Purdy, 2009). Several 39 
proposals were brought forward, such as professionalization of the EB and appropriate 40 
administrative rule with an appeal process to increase transparency (Lin and Streck, 2009; Streck and 41 
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Lin, 2008). While an appeal process was not introduced to date, several improvements such as 1 
granting the possibility of discussing directly through a phone call with the UNFCCC Secretariat the 2 
outcome of PDD evaluation to clarify issues, were introduced. An assessment of the commercial 3 
activities of the participants to UNEP Risoe's CDM Bazaar shows that different regulatory designs 4 
have strong implications on value chain creation, for example influencing the role of specialized CDM 5 
consultancies (Schneider et al., 2010). 6 
A key regulatory issue during this phase was the issue of auditing project rule conformity and GHG 7 
emission reduction which is performed by third parties accredited by the CDM EB, the so called 8 
Designated Operational Entities (DOEs). These entities are hired by the project owners for 9 
performing the validation and, except in the case of small-scale projects, the DOE validating projects 10 
cannot verify the emission reductions generated by the projects. DOEs need to check the conformity 11 
of proposed activities against the set of requirements and rules defined by the EB. Researchers 12 
emphasized the inherent flaws of delegating authority under the CDM to private actors (Hickmann, 13 
2013) while others pointed to the fact that the risk of losing accreditation outweighs the potential 14 
benefits of gaming the system (Shishlov and Bellassen, 2012). Third party auditors also faced 15 
challenges in safeguarding environmental integrity, due to lack of clear guidelines on how to 16 
interpret existing rules and requirements for CDM activities, hiring of DOEs by the project owners 17 
and resulting in pressures on projects registration, time and ability of the DOEs in developing 18 
sufficient internal expertise (Dyck, 2011). Researchers pointed out that interactions between buyers 19 
and verifiers, including disputes, should be regulated in a stable legal framework (Simonetti, 2010). 20 
Introduction of a materiality threshold for verification at UNFCCC level might reduce transaction 21 
costs and increase DOEs’ objectivity in validations and verifications, reducing inconsistencies (Cole, 22 
2011). 23 
When assessing the differences among host country domestic CDM governance structures, links can 24 
be identified to the specific governance structure in each country (Newell, 2009). A combination of 25 
the CDM and carbon tax for developing countries (where emission reductions achieved under the 26 
carbon tax can be exported) was proposed by Timilsina (2009) to increase host country welfare; 27 
actually a number of countries are now combining carbon taxes with the CDM, e.g. Mexico and 28 
Colombia.  29 
 30 
FRAGMENTATION OF CARBON MARKETS IN 2012-2014 31 
Main features of the period: volatility and decline of carbon markets 32 
Falling demand for carbon credits 33 
The main source of demand for CDM and JI credits - the EU ETS - started to fade in 2011-2012 as the 34 
issuance of CERs and ERUs started reaching the quantitative limits on the use of offsets. This limit 35 
was set in order to ensure that at least half of the emissions reductions necessary under the KP 36 
would be achieved domestically. This is often referred to as “supplementarity principle” 37 
(Michaelowa, 2014). The initial no-cap option under the EU Linking Directive was pushed by EU 38 
Member states but the EU commission prevailed (Flåm, 2009). The total demand for international 39 
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carbon credits from the EU ETS was thus estimated at around 1.6 billion tCO2e until 2020 (Bellassen 1 
et al., 2012).  2 
Another important source of demand for carbon credits came from governments of countries – most 3 
notably Japan – that required them for compliance under the KP. Indeed, the analysis of the final 4 
data for national GHG emissions and exchanges in carbon units during the first KP Commitment 5 
Period demonstrated that overall, the Annex B parties to the KP surpassed their aggregate 6 
commitment and that all individual countries were in compliance, with 9 of 36 countries – Austria, 7 
Denmark, Iceland, Japan, Lichtenstein, Luxembourg, Norway, Spain and Switzerland – achieving it 8 
only thanks to the use of flexibility mechanisms (Shishlov et al., 2016). This source of demand was 9 
estimated to be around 300 million tCO2e between 2008 and 2015 (Bellassen et al., 2012). 10 
Heindl and Voigt (2012) estimated that should the OECD countries fulfil the “Copenhagen Pledges” 11 
and seek cost containment, the potential demand for carbon offsets would be 627-667 MtCO2e per 12 
year. However, the “Copenhagen pledges” were never translated into binding emissions reduction 13 
targets, e.g. under the second Kyoto Commitment period. Moreover, the Doha Amendment that 14 
prolongs the Kyoto Protocol into its second Commitment Period (2013-2020) never entered into 15 
force, since it was not ratified by a sufficient number of countries. 16 
Increasing supply of carbon credits 17 
On the supply side, the CDM was stably delivering CERs. The supply of offsets is also weakly sensitive 18 
to prices: once the initial investments in a project are undertaken, it makes sense to issue CERs as 19 
long as carbon revenues exceed marginal operational and transaction costs (Shishlov and Bellassen, 20 
2012). It was demonstrated that transaction costs for CDM projects range from less than USD 21 
0.1/tCO2e for large industrial gas projects to USD 1.5/tCO2e and above for small-scale projects 22 
(Shishlov and Bellassen, 2016). Towards the end of the first Commitment Period there was a large 23 
increase of issuance of carbon credits from JI projects in Russia and Ukraine, which is usually 24 
explained by the rush to sell credits before the demand fades. This “flood” of JI credits further 25 
contributed to the oversupply of the market although this was forecasted ex-ante (Korppoo and 26 
Gassan-Zade, 2014). 27 
Green Investment Scheme 28 
The Green Investment Scheme (GIS) concept was introduced in order to tackle the issue of “hot air”, 29 
i.e. large surpluses of AAUs accumulated in Eastern European countries. Under a GIS, the revenues 30 
obtained by a country from the sale of surplus AAUs must be invested in domestic emission 31 
reduction activities or policies. The GIS is therefore supposed to link the surplus AAUs trades to 32 
tangible emission reductions, although not necessarily preserving the ratio of one AAU per tCOeq 33 
abated (Shishlov et al. 2012). GIS have had various degrees of success, failing in Ukraine (Korppoo 34 
and Gassan-Zade 2014) while working well for certain energy efficiency technologies in the Czech 35 
Republic (Karásek and Pavlica 2016). 36 
Steadily increasing supply of carbon credits was thus rapidly saturating the aggregate demand – 37 
from the EU ETS and national governments – which was estimated at between 1.6 and 1.9 billion 38 
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tCO2e until 2015 (Figure 4). Based on this supply-demand disequilibrium Bellassen et al. (2012) 1 
forecasted that CER and ERU prices would collapse, which proved prophetic. 2 
Falling carbon credit prices 3 
CER prices were largely correlated with the EUA prices until late-2011 (see figure below). EUA prices 4 
have been following an overall downward trend following the economic recession, emissions 5 
reductions due to other policies (e.g. renewable energy), as well as the inflow of international offsets 6 
(Koch et al., 2014). As the CER import limit was filling up, starting in late-2011 an increasing 7 
decorrelation between EUA and CDM credit prices could be observed culminating in CER prices 8 
collapsing below EUR 1/tCO2e. 9 
Figure 2: Annual average CER, ERU and EU allowance prices 2004 - 2016 10 
 11 
Data sources: Point Carbon (EUAs), Bluenext/EEX (secondary CERs/ERUs), World Bank reports on the 12 
state of the carbon markets 13 
Voluntary carbon markets: 14 
Voluntary carbon markets have emerged in various jurisdictions and triggered various privately 15 
managed standards of which Verra (formerly Verified Carbon Standard) is the biggest one. Prices of 16 
credits vary significantly event among projects of the same type and are intransparent. Some 17 
voluntary markets use credits from international carbon markets. The total volume of credits traded 18 
on voluntary market is only a few percent of the international and national compliance markets. 19 
Hamrick and Galant (2017) provide a thorough overview about the current status of the voluntary 20 
markets. 21 
 22 
Key market and regulatory challenges in this period 23 
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Projects squeezed between falling demand and rising supply costs 1 
While the CER prices were falling, the costs of mitigation actions under the CDM were going up with 2 
time as project developers started to exhaust the cheap options (Rahman et al., 2015). The fall in 3 
carbon prices combined with regulatory uncertainty on the future of the CDM in the post-2012 4 
climate regime resulted in a drastic decrease in the number of new CDM project registrations.  5 
The fall in carbon credit prices was particularly painful for LDCs where PoAs had finally started to 6 
foster many new projects and where past capacity building had started to bear fruit (Kreibich et al., 7 
2017). Indeed, by 2017 Africa represented 34% of PoAs compared to only 3% of regular CDM 8 
projects, while LDCs accounted for 19% of PoAs compared to only 1.6% of regular CDM projects 9 
(Figure 3). The declining market, however, threatened the gradual loss of this accumulating capacity 10 
of low-income countries to develop low-carbon projects. 11 
Figure 3. Geographical distribution of PoAs and CDM projects until 2017. 12 
 13 
Source: UNEP DTU (2019b) 14 
The accumulating experience with PoAs focused on household appliances in developing countries 15 
demonstrated that the uptake of new technologies might be much lower than expected. This was 16 
confirmed by case studies of projects focused on improved cookstoves in India (Aung et al., 2016) 17 
and Kenya (Freeman and Zerriffi, 2014) and water filters in Kenya (Pickering et al., 2017) raising 18 
issues about ex-post monitoring of emissions reductions and other co-benefits. It was suggested that 19 
more rigorous research was needed for underlying assumptions and monitoring approaches for 20 
household water treatment projects (Summers et al., 2015) and cookstoves (Lee et al., 2014).  21 
However, these results are not unequivocal, as at the same time, a case study of improved 22 
cookstoves and water filters in Rwanda demonstrated very high uptake rates. It was suggested that 23 
continued engagement with households contributed to high adoption rates (Barstow et al., 2016). 24 
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An important challenge in using carbon finance for low-income households is that the current 1 
consumption may not reflect the real need for basic services. The CDM rules have evolved to include 2 
the consideration of this “suppressed demand” in baselines, but challenges remained to balance 3 
simplification with maintaining environmental integrity (Randall, 2015). The PoA structure also 4 
supported the dissemination of such household technologies more efficiently than project-based 5 
activities. 6 
 7 
Accelerating the CDM reform 8 
At its 63rd meeting in September 2011, the CDM EB decided to establish a High-Level Panel to 9 
conduct a policy dialogue involving the civil society, policymakers and market participants. The 10 
intent was to review past CDM experience and prepare the mechanism for the post- 2012 period. 11 
The Panel was composed of 11 leaders of companies, NGOs and governmental bodies not directly 12 
involved in the CDM. The policy dialogue consisted of 58 public input submissions, 18 consultations 13 
with stakeholders and 17 informal meetings. In September 2012 at the 69th meeting of the CDM EB, 14 
the Panel published the final report consisting of 51 recommendations that address not only the 15 
CDM EB, but also other stakeholders including national governments, the UNFCCC and project 16 
participants (UNFCCC, 2012).  17 
Key issues addressed in the CDM Policy Dialogue were: (i) streamlining the project cycle; (ii) changing 18 
the methods for determining additionality; (iii) modifying the role of the secretariat; (iv) improving 19 
the validation and verification model; (v) professionalization of the EB; (vi) implementation of an 20 
appeals mechanism; and (vii) strengthening the current stakeholder consultation system (Classen, 21 
2012). 22 
CARBON MARKETS AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS POST-PARIS 23 
Main features of the period: post-Paris revival of carbon markets 24 
From the top down to a bottom up climate policy regime 25 
The 21st Conference of Parties (COP21) held in Paris in December 2015 marked an historical turning 26 
point regarding fighting climate change: the Paris Agreement (PA) established ambitious global 27 
mitigation targets, with the goal of limiting temperature increase well below 2°C, with efforts to 28 
contain the temperature increase within 1.5°C (Art. 2). Moreover, a balance of emissions by sources 29 
and removal by sinks is to be reached by the second half of the century (Art 4.1). A global 30 
stocktaking (Art. 14.1 and 2) will be undertaken every 5 years, starting in 2023. 31 
Unlike the KP that only covered developed countries, the PA adopted in 2015 involves global 32 
participation, which comes, however, at the cost of increasing complexity. The PA requires Parties to 33 
submit their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) which indicate mitigation (and in some 34 
cases adaptation) targets set on a voluntary basis by each Party under the PA and can also identify 35 
the instruments and measures to achieve them. This new regime, however, resulted in a significant 36 
level of heterogeneity complicating mitigation accounting (Kreibich and Obergassel, 2016). The 37 
international climate regime has thus changed its character from a top-down approach based on 38 
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mandatory emissions commitments to a bottom-up system of voluntary government pledges. 1 
Generally, the transition toward a bottom-up regime risks a reduction of transparency and increases 2 
in the transaction costs of mitigation (Michaelowa, 2015). The combination of existing, emerging, 3 
and potential carbon market-mechanisms can be regarded as an emerging pre-2020 fragmented 4 
global carbon market landscape based on differing bottom-up market-based approaches (Redmond 5 
and Convery, 2015). 6 
National carbon markets: 7 
Over the last 15 years, national and sub-national carbon markets, mainly emissions trading systems 8 
have proliferated. Not only industrialized countries but also emerging economies, such as Korea and 9 
China have introduced emissions trading. In the last five years, also offsetting against carbon taxes 10 
has started to be applied. While in the past, most national carbon markets had some link to 11 
international carbon markets, the EU’s closing of its market for international credits triggered similar 12 
closures as countries wanted to prevent being swamped by low-priced international credits. World 13 
Bank and Ecofys (2018) provide a comprehensive overview about all carbon pricing instruments, 14 
while ICAP (2019) provides an overview of emissions trading initiatives. 15 
 16 
Market mechanisms under the Paris Agreement 17 
The fate of international carbon markets post-Kyoto remained uncertain for a number of years. The 18 
negotiations under the UNFCCC on the New Market Mechanisms (NMM) and the Framework for 19 
Various Approaches (FVA), which covers both market-based and non-market-based approaches, 20 
have been ongoing since COP13 in Bali in 2007. Limited progress has been achieved by 2012 and a 21 
number of important design elements remained outstanding in the negotiations concerning the 22 
NMM and its modalities and procedures (Kulovesi, 2012). These negotiations advanced slowly 23 
towards COP21 and the inclusion of cooperative mechanisms into the PA was one of the last-minute 24 
surprises (Dransfeld et al. 2016). 25 
In order to encourage international collaboration and improve the cost-effectiveness of the 26 
achievement of NDCs, the Article 6 of the PA provides an array of market and non-market 27 
mechanisms: 28 
• Article 6.2 defines Cooperative Approaches (CA) which involve the transfer of 29 
“internationally transferred mitigation outcomes” (ITMOs) which can be used to fulfil a 30 
country’s NDC targets. CAs are generally understood to be a mean through which parties 31 
can trade ITMOs bilaterally or in groups for instance through GHG crediting mechanisms, 32 
linking of emission trading schemes or direct government-to-government transfers. The 33 
mechanism is subject to UNFCCC guidance, but not direct international supervision. It 34 
can therefore be compared with International Emissions Trading and the JI Track 1 under 35 
the Kyoto Protocol. 36 
• Article 6.4 establishes a new market mechanism for generation of emissions credits – 37 
often called “Sustainable Development Mechanism” (SDM) – which is centrally governed 38 
by a UNFCCC body and is also meant to contribute to sustainable development in host 39 
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countries. From the governance standpoint, the SDM can thus be compared with the 1 
CDM and JI Track 2.  2 
• Article 6.8, in contrast to the SDM and CAs, “recognizes” the importance of non-market 3 
approaches to (a) Promote mitigation and adaptation ambition; (b) Enhance public and 4 
private sector participation; and (c) Enable opportunities for coordination across 5 
instruments and relevant institutional arrangements. At this point in time it is unclear 6 
how such approaches will function at the end. Article 6.8 might for example become a 7 
framework for public climate finance flows.  8 
Key market and regulatory challenges in this period 9 
Increasing the mitigation ambition 10 
Some analysts argue that the new generation of international carbon markets should directly 11 
contribute to raising mitigation ambition as opposed to being a “zero-sum game” (Cames et al., 12 
2016). For example, while the CDM could theoretically increase ambition and provide “net 13 
mitigation” when crediting periods are shorter than the project lifetime, additionality issues put this 14 
possibility into question (Erickson et al., 2014). Discounting carbon credits and using baselines below 15 
business-as-usual were put forward as potential ways to provide “net mitigation” (Warnecke, 2014). 16 
One of the suggestions to boost ambition, was the creation of a Club of Carbon Markets (CCM) that 17 
would establish common standards for market infrastructure, transparency and environmental 18 
integrity (Keohane et al., 2017). It was argued that such a club could foster increased participation in 19 
climate change mitigation in the same way as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 20 
helped broaden trade in products and services.  21 
Linking different national and regional ETS was suggested to improve their economic efficiency and 22 
potentially help raise ambition. At the same time, there are some important risks related to linking, 23 
such as loss of control over domestic carbon policies (Ranson and Stavins 2016). “Exchange rates” 24 
were suggested to be used for linked systems in a similar way as currency exchange rates function 25 
(Pillay and Vinuales, 2016). Earlier research by Haites and Wang (2009) point out that linking 26 
different emission trading schemes does not in itself necessarily ensure higher environmental 27 
integrity of the linked systems. Moreover, actual difficulties should be considered and policy 28 
development and institutional cooperation are necessary to link different schemes. Tuerk et al. 29 
(2009) found that at that time only little advancement could be theoretically made to link different 30 
schemes, due to differences in policy priorities and needs for harmonization. Even if difficulties are 31 
present due to different domestic and international policies, it was argued that the EU and the USA 32 
would benefit from a linked carbon market (Sterk and Kruger, 2009). While the questions of linking 33 
national and regional carbon markets have been open for a decade, the issue of linking the 34 
fragmented carbon pricing initiatives becomes particularly important in the post-Paris international 35 
climate regime given the absence of a universal linking mechanism. 36 
Baselines and additionality for the Paris Mechanisms  37 
While the Article 6 mechanisms may provide governments with access to less costly mitigation 38 
options, they could also provide an important incentive to increase the ambition of NDCs over time. 39 
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However, in order for this potential to be realized additionality must be defined carefully in the 1 
context of the Paris Agreement, especially if applied to policy instruments (Michaelowa, 2017). 2 
Using the CDM experience, it was argued early on that new market mechanisms should be focused 3 
on ensuring a high level of environmental integrity (Newell 2012a) particularly through the 4 
determination of project additionality (Bento et al., 2015a; Michaelowa and Butzengeiger, 2017) and 5 
the emissions baseline used to calculate crediting volumes (Michaelowa, 2012; Bento et al., 2015b). 6 
Indeed, many NDCs have baselines that are above any credible business-as-usual path. It is thus 7 
highly likely that a significant number of NDCs would generate “hot air” if NDC baselines were to be 8 
used as a basis for crediting emission reductions or allocating emission allowances. The experience 9 
gained with JI leads to a clear recommendation for the Paris mechanisms – international oversight is 10 
crucial to prevent transfers of “hot air” (Michaelowa and Hoch, 2017). The issue of additionality 11 
under the Article 6 of the PA is further complicated by three factors (Spalding-Fecher et al., 2017). 12 
First, the nature of the conditionality of the NDC pledges is not clear. Secondly, there is a number of 13 
technical issues with translating the NDC pledges into metrics that are suitable for baselines and 14 
additionality assessment. Thirdly, using NDC pledges for crediting baselines assumes that these 15 
pledges are below business-as-usual emissions, which is not the case in practice (Michaelowa and 16 
Hoch, 2017). In the context of the Article 6 of the PA an additionality algorithm was suggested 17 
depending on whether a given activity is covered by an NDC, whether it is conditional or 18 
unconditional and whether an NDC is likely to generate “hot air” (Michaelowa et al. 2019).  19 
An important issue that was raised for renewable energy projects in developing countries was the 20 
fact that in in the context of widespread energy shortage, the extra electricity produced by the CDM 21 
projects is more likely to be used to provide extra electricity supply rather than substitute the 22 
Business-as-usual (BAU) electricity supply (Zhu and Tang, 2015). Appropriate baseline setting was 23 
found to be the best instrument for minimizing non-additional offsets compared to trade ratios and 24 
quantitative limits (Bento et al., 2015b). 25 
It will also be important to make sure that the flexibility mechanisms do not deter setting ambitious 26 
emissions reduction targets and/or policies. Indeed, some researchers argued that the CDM is not 27 
neutral on the global level of carbon emissions as it entices countries to raise their emission caps 28 
(Brechet et al., 2016). It was therefore suggested that for future market mechanisms, a coordinated 29 
approach is needed to address potential trade-offs between global and national incentives at the 30 
sector-wide level (Liu, 2015). 31 
Issues related to Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (MRV)  32 
MRV is paramount in ensuring the environmental integrity of carbon markets and will therefore 33 
have to be properly addressed in the rules for the implementation of the Article 6 of the Paris 34 
Agreement. MRV, however, comes at a cost that in the CDM ranged from several cents to EUR 1.20 35 
and above per tCO2e depending on the project type. Generally, there is a trade-off between the 36 
stringency and the cost of monitoring, which if not addressed properly may become a major barrier 37 
for the implementation of mitigation projects in some sectors, particularly in the context of currently 38 
low international carbon prices (Shishlov and Bellassen, 2016). For example, monitoring rules under 39 
the CDM are often more stringent than those under the EU ETS, which could potentially put an 40 
unreasonable burden on project developers (Warnecke, 2014). 41 
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Double counting is another important carbon accounting issue that needs to be addressed under the 1 
PA. The key challenge is that double counting can occur in several different ways, such as double 2 
issuance and double claiming. While avoiding these problems is difficult it is technically possible 3 
through a coherent set of rules for accounting of units, design of mechanisms, and tracking and 4 
reporting of units (Schneider et al., 2015). 5 
The future role of the CDM 6 
The future role of the CDM remains uncertain and will depend upon the evolution of countries’ 7 
NDCs and the development of the Article 6 rulebook. While the CDM is part of the KP, it could 8 
theoretically continue beyond 2020, for example, if recycled into the Sustainable Development 9 
Mechanism under Article 6.4 of the PA. In this respect, different scenarios for the CDM future – from 10 
expansion to phase-out – can be envisaged (Vivid Economics, 2012).  11 
With regards to pre-2020 action, several recommendations were made, most notably (Cames, 2016): 12 
• Limiting the purchase of CERs to either existing projects with discontinuation risk, such as 13 
landfill gas flaring, or to new projects that have a high likelihood of ensuring environmental 14 
integrity. 15 
• Accompanying purchase of CERs with support for a transition of host countries to broader 16 
and more effective climate policies.  17 
• Focusing international crediting mechanisms to address specific emission sources in 18 
countries that do not have the capacity to implement alternative climate policies. 19 
In some instances, the CDM might be seen as a transition mechanism to other climate policies, once 20 
the abatement cost has been discovered by the market. This was the case, for example, with HFC 21 
emissions that were included in direct regulations under the Montreal Protocol after the initial 22 
experience under the CDM. In some countries – most notably China – the CDM is being transformed 23 
into a domestic offsetting mechanism under the newly piloted national carbon trading scheme with 24 
more than 2000 projects re-validated for this purpose (Lo and Cong, 2017). 25 
 26 
Conclusion 27 
The international carbon markets experienced widely varying fortunes since the 1990s. This is due to 28 
political and economic drivers that affect the development of the carbon markets. The following 29 
figure depicts the different phases and fortunes of market mechanisms, as well as their key drivers. 30 
Figure 4. Differing fortunes of international carbon markets over time 31 
 32 
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 1 
Source: authors 2 
The emergence period is characterized by the introduction of market mechanisms as a climate 3 
change mitigation tool. Parties to the UNFCCC negotiated the definition of the flexible mechanisms 4 
that were included in the Kyoto Protocol (1997) and their operational rules and procedures that 5 
were included in the Marrakech Accords (2001). The operationalization of the CDM and JI required 6 
the establishment of officially approved baseline and monitoring methodologies and piloting 7 
activities in different sectors. The nascent carbon market was characterized by the lack of demand 8 
from the private sector making the initial participation of the public sector through various credit 9 
purchasing programs and carbon funds crucial. 10 
After the initial testing period, the carbon markets entered a phase of great expansion. This period is 11 
characterized by significant changes in markets and regulatory frameworks as the EU ETS became 12 
operational and was linked to the CDM creating a large source of demand for carbon credits from 13 
the private sector adding to the demand from governments, e.g. in Japan. Large developing 14 
countries, such as China, India, Brazil, Mexico and South Korea became the largest suppliers of 15 
carbon credits under the CDM. This raised concerns about the uneven distribution and limited 16 
participation of LDCs. The introduction of the PoA concept was aimed at addressing this issue. In 17 
terms of the sectoral breakdown, the supply of carbon credits was initially dominated by industrial 18 
gas projects that provided a cheap GHG abatement opportunity but raised criticism for creating 19 
perverse production incentives and not contributing to sustainable development. Additionality also 20 
emerged as a key issue particularly for large-scale renewable energy projects, such as large hydro. In 21 
the second part of the gold rush period, regulation regarding assessment of CDM project 22 
additionality and verification was strengthened significantly, with validators and verifiers becoming 23 
more careful following suspensions of accreditations by the regulators due to low quality work. 24 
The fragmentation period is characterized by a sudden decline in carbon prices between 2011 and 25 
2013 and the resulting decline in the development of new carbon projects. This is related to both 26 
domestic and international regulatory regimes. At the domestic level, the issuance of carbon credits 27 
started reaching the quantitative limits on the use of offsets in the EU ETS effectively eliminating the 28 
23 
 
largest source of demand. The qualitative limits on the use of offsets that were introduced by the EU 1 
starting in 2013 therefore did not really matter. At the international level, the uncertainty 2 
surrounding the second Kyoto Commitment Period resulted in decreased demand from 3 
governments. The carbon market price collapse also led to multiple bankruptcies or scaling down of 4 
specialized consulting firms, in turn resulting in the gradual loss of expertise as specialists moved to 5 
other fields. 6 
Table 1 below summarizes the features and challenges of the four periods. 7 
Table 1: Key features and challenges of the different carbon market periods 8 
Time period Main features of the period Key challenges 
1997 – 2005 
Emergence 
- Parties negotiate for the definition of the 
flexible mechanisms and for the definition 
of their operational rules and procedures 
- After initial testing through AIJ, the CDM, 
JI and IET are agreed 
- Initial implementation of activities in 
different sectors 
- Carbon markets created and catalysed to 
demonstrate the potential for low cost 
emission reduction and compliance with 
Kyoto targets 
- Environmental integrity and economic 
efficiency of the mechanisms are studied 
in detail 
- Evaluation of the cost effectiveness and 
associated risks for investors  
- Initial testing of different design models 
- Environmental integrity and contribution 
to Sustainable Development 
- Baseline setting and additionality 
concerns 
- Provision of incentives for technology 
transfer and innovation 
- Definition of eligible activities and 
associated issues for the forestry sector 
- Forestry projects are criticized for the 
negative impacts on SD at local level and 
for indigenous people 
2006-2011 
“Gold rush” 
- After the initial testing period the carbon 
markets start a phase of great expansion.  
- EU is the main source of demand for CDM 
credits while China and India dominate 
their supply  
- Improvements of the rules of the CDM, 
with operationalization of the PoA concept 
reducing transaction costs of small-scale 
projects and contribute to a more balanced 
distribution  
- Governance and institutional set up, 
including capacity building needs, emerge 
as a key element for the carbon market 
functioning 
- Additionality and baseline setting face 
significant issues affecting the 
environmental integrity of the CDM 
- Questionable contribution to SD and 
technology transfer 
- “Low hanging fruits” and uneven 
geographical distribution, penalizing Africa 
- Forest sector under close scrutiny also 
during this period, to avoid adverse 
impacts and ensure delivery of local SD 
benefits 
- Projects risks are assessed in more detail, 
through analysis of several years of 
operations 
2012-2014 
Fragmentation  
- After the “gold rush”, uncertainties on the 
future climate regime and lack of 
mitigation ambition of Annex I countries 
affect the carbon markets negatively 
- After failure of the Doha Amendment in 
December 2012 on ratification of the 
second commitment period of Kyoto (CP2), 
prices drop quickly reaching all-time low. 
Investors have less confidence on market 
mechanisms 
- Regarding the JI and CDM, only PoAs still 
show signs of life, with submission for 
- Carbon credit supply hits the EU’s demand 
ceiling  
- Supply-demand disequilibrium leads to 
carbon price collapse 
- Carbon prices are too low to spur the 
development of new projects 
- Risk of project discontinuation and 
capacity loss 
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Time period Main features of the period Key challenges 
registrations and issuances, although with 
limited numbers 
- CDM reforms in order to reduce 
transaction costs 
2015 – 2018 
Post-Paris 
perspectives 
- Prices in the carbon markets are still very 
low. Limited activities in the international 
carbon markets 
- The PA brings positive developments 
regarding market instruments through 
Article 6. Detailed modalities and 
procedures for the new mechanisms (i.e. 
the SDM and CAs) are still to be defined 
- An increasing number of developed and 
developing countries implements or plans 
to do so, carbon pricing initiatives, some of 
which allow use of credits 
- Need to increase mitigation ambition at 
global level, particularly given that many 
NDCs may generate “hot air” 
- Transition of the CDM to the PA is 
contentious. Issues with baselines and 
additionality, and on MRV  
- Stronger emphasis on the importance of 
SD benefits and need to avoid negative 
impacts of market mechanisms 
 
 1 
The post-Paris period is characterized by significant changes in the international climate regime that 2 
will affect the development of carbon markets in the future. Unlike the Kyoto Protocol that only 3 
covered developed countries, the Paris Agreement adopted in 2015 involves global participation, 4 
which comes, however, at the cost of increasing complexity. Instead of a uniform formula of “carbon 5 
budgets” translated in tonnes of CO2eq, the Paris Agreement requires Parties to define their 6 
Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) indicating the voluntarily set mitigation targets for each 7 
Party, while the adaptation targets may not be included. While the Paris Agreements includes 8 
provisions for market mechanisms through Articles 6.2 and 6.4, their modalities and procedures 9 
have not been adopted yet and the practical implementation remains uncertain. Principally, their 10 
scope could be upscaled to cover policy instruments or even entire sectors, which will inevitably 11 
raise issues how to guarantee additionality and set crediting baselines. While the international 12 
carbon market remains uncertain, an increasing number of domestic carbon pricing initiatives have 13 
been launched around the world in the past several years. 14 
Past experiences with carbon markets show key necessary conditions for a successful operation of 15 
these mechanisms. First, markets are dependent on mitigation ambition and the willingness of 16 
governments to create direct or indirect demand for emission credits. Second, the direct 17 
involvement of the private sector is crucial to rapidly mobilize mitigation activities of various types 18 
and scales. Third, the environmental integrity is crucial to ensure credibility and acceptability in a 19 
time where markets generally are put into doubt. Fourth, complexity and related transaction costs 20 
have to be managed carefully in order not to stifle activities. All of these conditions are not yet 21 
fulfilled under the Paris Agreement. In order to upscale activities under market mechanisms and to 22 
ensure that government engagement focuses on the right issues, we suggest that the interactions of 23 
market mechanisms with domestic mitigation policies are considered carefully, that baseline setting 24 
and additionality determination take into account the significant risk of hot air creation by 25 
insufficiently ambitious NDCs and that the public and NGOs are reconciled with market mechanisms 26 
through robust safeguards against negative social and environmental impacts.  27 
25 
 
The current process of revision of Nationally Determined Contributions and the setting of rules for 1 
Article 6 provide two crucial opportunities to ensure that international market mechanisms can play 2 
their role in achieving the ambitious long term targets of the Paris Agreement. 3 
 4 
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